A Special Human Biology
The Vision of Pierre Teilhard de Chardin
By Brian COWAN

Teilhard states that biology evolves without special borders into human socialization, of which religion is an important part. Hence religion behaves like a biological phylum.


Teilhard expresses his support for a new approach to human biology. In this regard he advocates 'a special biology of man: a biology that is necessitated by, and defined by, the breakthrough of reflection.' (1) Granted, such a biology will have features in common with the normal, everyday biological sciences that deal with life at the levels of 'viruses and genes' and 'cellular beings'. (2) But humanity needs a special biology of its own because humankind is, itself, special in that it possesses characteristics which transcend those found at, say, the strictly viral or cellular planes of life.

The human race, as the French Jesuit sees it, is not simply another zoological grouping among countless other such groupings. No, from his perspective, when the first humans appeared upon the surface of the earth, around the end of the Tertiary period, they constituted, in effect, 'a second species of life' (3), a significantly novel form of vitality with brand new powers never before exercised on our globe.

From Teilhard's standpoint, what will render his proposed, new, human biology so special is the fact that it will take into account all of these novel powers instead of passing over them in silence, as, by and large, happens at the present time. Let's try to pin down some of the new powers that appertain, on our planet, exclusively to the "second species of life", to humankind.

Human Intelligence

Humanity, Teilhard tells us, is the only zoological group that thinks abstractly, that reflects. 'Man', we are told by the Jesuit from Auvergne, 'is the only being, within the limits of our experience, who not only knows, but knows that he knows.' (4) As Teilhard sees it, the human phylum was the only one that, here on earth, 'was able, at a given moment (towards the end of the Tertiary period) to break through the mysterious surface which separates the sphere of intelligence from that of instinct'. (5)

1. The emergence of human consciousness

Teilhard assumes, without evidence, that homo sapiens, or even earlier hominids, were reflective from their initial evolution. He does not apply the evolutionary paradigm to the development of human self-consciousness. There is clear evidence that human self-consciousness is less than 4,000 years old and is a product of human self-creation. [Tony KELLY, 27/3/02]
What is the "clear evidence"? [Grahame FALLON, 27.03.02]
As Brian has pointed out, Teilhard's view of human self-creation is very similar to mine. The difference appears to be that Teilhard sees the faculty of self-consciousness as something that is ultimately latent in all matter, while I see only an intrinsic organising principle or logos as latent in matter, with this logos giving rise to the self-organization of matter, eventually producing the Earth and, following the initiation of life, giving rise to the more complex mutations that are presented for selection, a process which moves beyond self-organization towards self-creation. When human cultures begin, evolution becomes cultural evolution, ultimately producing moral cultures, at which time human moral-cultural self-creation becomes totally free self-creation, in contrast to the deterministic self-organization of matter that began the process of the cosmos. The detailed arguments in favour of that scenario can be seen in "The Process of the Cosmos: Philosophical Theology and Cosmology" (1999) USA, Dissertation.com, particularly Chapter 5, also on my Web Page.

I argue that it is only with the emergence of self-consciousness that the moral sense emerges. Humans had tribal rules (often immoral) before 4,000 years ago, but the emergence of morality per se falls within the last 4,000 years, the best evidence being Moses. [Tony KELLY, 29.03.02]

My [i.e. Brian's] suspicion grows that the gap between [the] outlook [that also self-consciousness was something that evolved] and Teilhard's [that Homo Sapiens was reflective from his initial existence] may not be as huge as might appear at first sight.

Tony argues "that human self-consciousness is less than 4,000 years old and is a product of human self-creation". Certainly, Teilhard agrees that humanity's growth in consciousness and self-consciousness involves man 'modifying, or even creating, his own self'. (41) So, for both visions, the element of self-creation (in the sense of self-development) is a factor in the evolution of human consciousness.

While Tony may be saying that self-consciousness just was not there at all prior to 4,000 years ago, Teilhard appears to be claiming that it was largely latent for a very long time, up to a time, perhaps, bordering on the 4,000 years or so ago to which Tony alludes. Here again the gap between Tony's "not there" and Teilhard's "largely latent" may not be a huge one.

Teilhard, I believe, spells out for us his view on the transit of powers of consciousness from latency to actuality in the following passage in which he begins by pointing our thoughts:

'...in the direction of a decisive expansion of our ancient powers, reinforced by the acquisition of certain new faculties of consciousness [e. g. the gradual acquisition of a faculty to think more on the basis of observations and less on the basis of myths?].

[We perceive the] expansion or even metamorphosis of certain ancient powers. For the last century, without greatly noticing it, we have been undergoing a remarkable transformation in the range of intellect. To discover and know has always been a deep tendency of our nature. Can we not recognise it already in cave man? But it is only yesterday [e. g. within less than 4,000 years into the past] that this essential need to know has become explicit and changed into a vital autonomous function, taking precedence in our lives over our preoccupation with food and drink.' (42)

Tony states that Teilhard "assumes without evidence, that homo sapiens, or even earlier hominids, were reflective from their initial evolution". Perhaps the French Jesuit would dispute the phrase "without evidence". I think he would say there is some evidence of at least rudimentary reflective activity, although, no doubt, he would concede that evidence is just that, evidence and not indubitable proof.

In my view, Teilhard's argument for possible evidence of the presence of reflective activity, prior to roughly 4,000 years ago, might run along lines such as the following. In his opinion, one of the signs of reflection is 'the power of rational invention' (43), the power to mentally visualize and then fabricate '"artificial" constructions' (44). And certainly there were inventions, artificial constructions, arising out of the hominoid phylum, prior to 4,000 years ago, inventions and constructions that, to all appearances, no other biological phylum was able to significantly rival. Some examples:

- The appearance of the first chipped stone tools, in Africa, about 2 million years ago. In this connection, Teilhard himself asks in a tone of wonderment: 'Between the last strata of the Pliocene period, in which man is absent, and the next, in which the geologist is dumbfounded to find the first chipped pieces of quartz, what has happened?' (45) He might try to answer his own question by opining that a creature capable of rudimentary inventive thought, thought that led to the invention of stone tools, had arrived on the terrestrial scene.
- The control of fire about 800 thousand years ago.
- The organization of large scale, co-ordinated animal hunts around 500 thousand years ago.
- The beginning of ritual burials approximately 60,000 years ago, possibly suggesting some religious sense and some notion of an afterlife.
- Record keeping (a primitive form of writing), by way of markings on bones, which appeared about 35,000 years ago.
- Artistic expression which began some 30,000 years ago or so by way of paintings on cave walls and the carving of figurines, both of which art forms may also have had a religious dimension.
- The invention of the bone needle and the bow and arrow between about 10 and 20 thousand years ago.
- The development of metallurgy and of agriculture likely not much more than 10 thousand years.
All of these inventions, as well as others not mentioned, would, I believe, be seen, by Teilhard, as evidence of at least rudimentary of reflective thought. To be sure, he would also see such primitive thinking as possessing the potential to expand into more fully blown states of awareness, for example the state of awareness associated with a well developed self-consciousness.

So perhaps what Teilhard is saying, as regards the emergence of human consciousness, is something like the following. The hominoid phylum has been on the road to self-awareness for some two million years or so. For an overwhelmingly vast majority of that time, the human powers of consciousness have been, to a not negligible degree, latent, and what powers were used got utilized mainly in aid of survival, in support of a "preoccupation with food and drink". Only recently have some of these powers made the transit from significant latency to significant actuality.

Perhaps I could present a what if scenario which Teilhard himself suggests. What if we were to claim that for most of the last 2 million years or so the humanoid phylum was really not significantly different (in terms of the journey to self-consciousness) from all of the other mammalian species on our globe? In my opinion, the French Jesuit, might, in reply to our query, repeat to us what he wrote in a 1948 essay. Within the pages of 'My Fundamental Vision' he, first of all, states that, in his opinion, 'man is the only being, within the limits of our experience, who not only knows, but knows that he knows.' (46) Then, in a footnote related to this statement, he adds:

'If, as we are sometimes told, other animal species shared this characteristic [i. e. the characteristic of knowing that we know] with us, then those species (which appeared chronologically before man) would long ago have become masters of the world; and in such conditions, man would never have appeared on earth.' (47)
So, in the eyes of the French Jesuit, our present biology, satisfactory though it is for dealing with instinctual life, needs to be significantly expanded, in its scope, if it is to be up to the task of adequately coping with thinking life. Otherwise put, today's biology, acceptable as it is for the scientific investigation of the biosphere, has to be enlarged in its purview, if it is to competently probe the noosphere.

In Teilhard's view, then, human beings, because they belong to the one terrestrial zoological group that has made the transit from instinctual to thinking life, possess a multiplicity of abilities, tendencies and aspirations which are lacking to the animal species whose conscious existence is rigidly circumscribed by non-reflective instinct. Let's look, in some detail, at a number of these abilities, tendencies and aspirations, and let's also try to get some idea as to how a specifically human biology might accommodate them.

2. Inventivity

Among the unique abilities associated with thought is that of 'the power of rational invention'. (6) From a biological perspective, we are led, Teilhard believes, to perceive our inventions, 'our "artificial" constructions' as manifesting 'an extension in reflective form of the obscure mechanism whereby each new form has always germinated on the trunk of life'. (7) It is the view of the Auvergnian Jesuit that 'the mole is a digging instrument' and that 'the porpoise is a swimming instrument and the bird a flying instrument'. (8) Further, as he sees it, there exists a connection between, on the one hand, these instruments, and, on the other hand, contrivances like the power shovel, the submarine and the aeroplane, which are, themselves also, respectively, a digging instrument, a swimming instrument and a flying instrument. In this connection he writes:

'To appreciate man at his true zoological value, we should not separate "natural" from "artificial" as absolutely as we do in our perspectives, that is to say ignore the profound connexions between the ship, the submarine, the aeroplane and the animal reconstitutions which produce the wing and the fin.' (9)
And what, we may ask, is the biological connection between the two sets of instruments? Well, both have germinated "on the trunk of life", the first set by way of instinct and the second set by way of reflection. Both have emerged from the same trunk of the same tree, the tree of terrestrial life. Now, because both sets are connected with life, both are connected with biology. From Teilhard's standpoint, a special human biology would take into account such phenomena as human inventions, perceiving them as extensions of human life, as aspects of human biology.

Another aspect of creative thinking is that it is a constructive, "evolutionary" reaction to problems and failure. As said L.L. Whyte:

'Thought is born of failure. Only when the human organism fails to achieve an adequate response to its situation is there material for the processes of thought, and the greater the failure the more searching they become.' [quoted by Janice Paulsen]
3. Seeing the future

A further ability connected to thought, Teilhard tells us is a 'pre-awareness of the future' (10), a precognition of what is to come which is far more elaborate than, say, that of a squirrel, the extent of whose powers of foresight may well not go much beyond perceiving that its next meal will consist of a particular nut lying in some grass close to the base of a nearby tree. Our human life form is one that foresees the future with significantly more clarity than any other form of life inhabiting our planet.

4. Organizing the future

Our pre-awareness of what may lie ahead, combined with our inventiveness, inclines us humans in the direction of planning and organizing out future. For example, we develop political and economic systems which we hope will permit our social relationships, and our exchanges of good and services, to be carried out at some level of co-ordination and order that we deem to be acceptable. We produce art and invent methods of writing, at least one of whose functions can be to preserve the past into the future. And all of these activities seem to arise naturally, and as a matter of course, out of our biological wherewithal, out of our vital make-up.

Death and Religion

The fact that we humans have some measure of precognition in relation to the future also permits us to foresee our own deaths. Further, thanks to the discoveries of our astronomers and astrophysicists, we understand that our own sun may well, some five thousand million years hence, arrive at its own end time. And, as part of the process of its demise, that sun will, perhaps, expand into its red giant phase, envelope our globe, and destroy all life on earth. Indeed, unless we are pretty well convinced that our universe is everlasting, we have to face the possibility of the eventual extinction of our cosmos by way, for example, of a "Big Crunch" (the reversal of expansion) or a "Big Whimper" (a prolongation of expansion to the point of a dispersal approaching infinity).

In the opinion of Teilhard, our prescience of death, be it at the personal, planetary or cosmic level, constitutes a factor in the rise of religion. Why? Well, one of the functions of religion is that of making sense of death. For his part, the French Jesuit finds unacceptable the prospect of an ultimate, total death for humankind, be that death individual or collective. In his view, should we humans, as a whole, ever become persuaded that our destiny, individually and collectively, is inexorably pointing us towards a dead end of total extinction, then terrestrial evolution will come to a standstill. As Teilhard sees it, the human species, confronted with the unavoidable prospect of complete annihilation, would 'realise once and for all that its only course would be to go on strike' (11), to shut down the shop-floor of evolution, so to speak. Why bother, we would ask ourselves, to toil away, pointlessly, at advancing a development that is, in the final analysis, going nowhere except to extinguishment?

'An animal', Teilhard tells us, 'may rush headlong down a blind alley or towards a precipice.' (12) But not so humanity, for 'man will never take a step in a direction he knows to be blocked.' (13) In the opinion of the Auvergnian Jesuit, no human being, having arrived at a certain critical level of awareness, will ever consent to enter the blind alley of ultimate pointlessness or hasten, unthinkingly, towards the precipice of complete annihilation. As Teilhard sees it, one of the functions of religion is to point out to humanity that its efforts are not pointless and that, by way of that part of its make-up which has become spiritualized, humankind does escape extinction, individually and collectively, through the attainment of immortality, or as he sometimes terms it, 'irreversibility' (14).

For Teilhard, then, in a certain real sense, religion, and its associated grapplings with the problem of death, arise out of biology, out of life, at the reflective level, at the level where life asks itself ultimate questions.

Towards Socialization

1. Choice and Ethics

In the opinion of the French Jesuit, a properly human biology will also link up with the realm of ethics or values, a realm where, as he puts it, there 'is attribution of value to the individual, who moves from being a mere link in the phyletic chain, to the dignity of an element capable of being integrated in an organic totalization.' (15) Pre-human, living entities can be little more than mere links in the evolutionary chain because, with no say in the matter, they simply serve to connect, phyletically, what went before them to what comes after them. By contrast, the value and dignity of human beings, in the view of the Auvergnian Jesuit, lies in their ability, within limits, to freely choose to support, or decline to support, the process of humanity's convergence (or totalization) upon itself. Let's consider this subject of human convergence a little more closely.

At the reflective level, terrestrial evolution, for Teilhard, tends of its very nature, to move convergently, confluently in the direction of becoming an organically unified, ultra-human, vital entity, in the direction, that is, of growing into 'a sort of super-organism' (16). But we, the human reflective elements, the 'grains of thought' (17) who constitute the current tending to confluence can say yea or nay to that current, and therein lies our value and our dignity. We humans have some limited power either, on the one hand, to facilitate that current or, on the other hand, to dam up, divert, or otherwise delay it; the choice is ours.

2. From biology to ethics

In Teilhard's opinion, the entry of that which is biological into the domain of values and ethics is an occurrence of some significance. In this connection he writes:

'One of the most important aspects of hominization [i. e. of the emergence of thought], from the point of view of the history of life, is the ascension of biological realities (or values) to the domain of moral realities (or values). From man onwards and in man, evolution has taken reflective consciousness of itself. Henceforth it can to some degree recognize its position in the world, choose its direction, and withhold its efforts.' (18)

At this point, though, we might still be hesitating over the question of whether it is legitimate to commingle together biology and ethics. We may continue to feel compelled to ask ourselves what real grounds we have for seeing, contrary to our intellectual tradition, the biological as an aspect of the moral and vice versa. I think that Père Teilhard might reply to this concern along the following lines. Humanity has the power and the liberty to enhance or stunt the advance of evolution. This self-directing power and this 'freedom of action' (19), which may be exercised pro or con evolution, are rooted in reflective life, in human life. And because the power of free choice, a sine qua non of ethics, is racinated in life, it has a biological tint to it. So, seen from a certain perspective, a biological aspect manifests itself in ethics and an ethical facet displays itself in human biology.

3. From Biology to Socialization

From Teilhard's standpoint, biology, at the reflective level, is prolonged in 'the socialization of mankind' (20); he quite clearly makes an 'identification of human socialization with the main terrestrial axis of evolution' (21). If I have understood the French Jesuit correctly, human socialization is a convergent 'process of in-folding' (22) of humankind upon itself. For him, the term "socialization" seems to be an approximate synonym for terms such as 'planetisation' (23), 'collectivisation' (24), and 'totalisation' (25), all of which terms appear to connote in-folding, confluence and convergence.

In the eyes of Teilhard, the trend in the direction of human socialization constitutes an evolutionary movement towards 'a sort of uniconscious super-organism' composed of 'races, peoples, nations merging together.' (26) The French Jesuit does appear to envisage humanity progressing towards a sort of common consciousness or mind, subtended in some fashion, by 'that great body made up of all our bodies'. (27)

Teilhard does concede that divergence has sometimes manifested itself more prominently than convergence at the pre-human level of evolution. He grants that reciprocal hostility has, on occasion, figured conspicuously in the behaviour of competing, pre-reflective, living individuals and groups as these individuals and groups have struggled to survive. In this regard he writes: 'Biologically speaking, what has hitherto driven living creatures to mutual destruction has clearly been the necessity which impelled them to supplant one another in order to survive.' (28) But, in the opinion of the French Jesuit, this propensity to internecine animosity begins to gradually change with the arrival, on the scene, of a reflective humanity. As he sees it, from the biological standpoint, there emerges an 'entirely new development in the case of the human race'. (29) And this new development consists in this:

'...that the outspreading and unfolding of [the pre-reflective] forms gradually gives way to a process of in-folding. Then the previous economy of nature undergoes a radical change: for converging branches do not survive by eliminating each other; they have to unite. Everything that formerly made for war now makes for peace, and the zoological laws of conservation and survival must wear an opposite sign if they are applied to man.' (30)
In the opinion of Teilhard, reflective life, in the process of socialization, introduces into the biological milieu a degree of 'autonomous control and self-orientation'. (31) In this regard, the French Jesuit writes that 'as a direct result of his socialization, man is beginning, with rational design, to take over the biological motive forces which determine his growth -- in other words, he is becoming capable of modifying, or even of creating, his own self.' (32) [As a matter of interest we may note that, in this quote, there is something of an echo of Tony Kelly's concept of human self-creation.] So, from Teilhard's perspective, one reason why human biology is special, is that it has, as its subject matter, a form of life that is sufficiently evolved to have acquired 'a power of auto-direction' (33), a form of life that is somewhat less subject to determinism than is pre-reflective vitality.

Teilhard makes it plain that, from his standpoint, 'the processes of chemistry and biology are continued without a break in the social sphere.' (34) In this regard, he writes that:

'...socialization is a direct equivalent, at the level of highly complex elements, of the associations which at a lower level produce the molecules of protein, for example, and the organic tissues; further, and most important of all, each new, and more successful human grouping automatically subtends a further increase of consciousness.' (35)
And, to be sure, in the human social sphere, there is more autonomy, more sefl-orientation, more freedom than we are accustomed, at present, to perceive in the subject matter of biology.

Biology and Religion

In an earlier section mention was made of how, in Teilhard's opinion, reflective life's prescience of bodily death was a factor in the rise of religion. As this submission draws to its close, I would like to turn my attention to a couple of further ways in which the French Jesuit links biology, in general, to religion. The first has to do with his blurring of the boundaries between science (including the science of biology) and religion. The second relates to his assimilating of Christianity to a living phylum. Let's look, one after the other, at these two linkages which Teilhard proposes as connections between the biological and the religious.

1. The Blurring of Boundaries Between Biology and Religion

Teilhard declines to draw a clear line of demarcation separating science (which includes biology) from religion. Does he not tell us that 'religion and science are the two conjugated faces or phases of one and the same complete act of knowledge'? (36) He also opines that 'there is less difference than people think between research and adoration.' (37) Here he comes very close, it seems to me, to blurring the line that divides scientific research from one of the forms of prayer, that of adoration or worship. [In some theological circles it is held that there are four general kinds of prayer as follows: a) that of adoration or worship; b) that of thanksgiving; c) that of repentance; d) that of petition]

2. Christianity Assimilated to a Living Phylum

Speaking of Christianity, Teilhard states that:

'Biologically, it behaves as a "phylum"; and by biological necessity it must, therefore, have the structure of a phylum; in other words it, it must form a coherent and progressive system of collectively associated spiritual elements.' (38)
And under the rubric of Christianity as a whole, he alludes to his own Roman Catholicism as 'the living organic axis' of the veritable 'religion of tomorrow'. (39) Further, in the eyes of the French Jesuit, 'the Christian phenomenon, historically speaking, is simply the final and central form assumed, following a long and complex phylogenesis, by the persistent emergence at the heart of hominization of the need to worship'. (40)

So, there would seem to be justification for claiming that, from a Teilhardian perspective, biology, in general, tends to introduce itself into precincts traditionally held to be the exclusive preserve of religion.


In conclusion, let's review some of the main points put forward in this submission.

1. From Teilhard's perspective, a special human biology is desirable, because humanity itself, among all terrestrial life forms, is special in that it is "a second species of life". Here on our planet, only humankind possesses well developed powers of reflective thought, of invention, of foresight, and of freedom to make ethical choices.

2. Only human beings, among all the living forms on the globe experience religious aspirations or as the French Jesuit puts it, "the need to worship".

3. Reflective terrestrial life has a tendency to converge and in-fold upon itself by way of a process of human socialization; all other species of life on earth incline in the direction of outspreading and unfolding themselves. The former vitality moves to convergence and organic unity; the latter vitalities drift off towards phyletic dispersion and multiplicity. Among humans there is a level of "auto-direction", of self-creation that is missing from pre-reflective vital entities. And in the opinion of the French Jesuit, an adequate human biology must take into account all of these special features that are part and parcel of human life.

4. Finally, we noted that, for Teilhard, there is a blurring of the boundaries between biology and religion and that, in his view, Christianity itself behaves like a biological phylum.

(1) 'My Fundamental Vision', in 'Toward the Future' (Harvest Book, 1975), p. 174.
(2) 'My Fundamental Vision', in 'Toward', p. 174.
(3) 'My Phenomenological View of the World et. al', in 'Toward', p. 213.
(4) 'My Fundamental Vision', in 'Toward', p. 171.
(5) 'My Fundamental Vision', in 'Toward', p. 173.
(6) 'My Fundamental Vision', in 'Toward', p. 174.
(7) 'The Phenomenon of Man' (Fountain Books, 1977), p. 246.
(8) 'Hominization', in 'The Vision of the Past' (Collins, 1966), pp. 56-57.
(9) 'Hominization', in 'Vision', p. 57.
(10) 'My Fundamental Vision', in 'Toward the Future' (Harvest Book, 1975), p. 174.
(11) 'The Phenomenon of Man' (Fountain Books, 1977), p. 335.
(12) 'Phenomenon', p. 254.
(13) 'Phenomenon', p. 254.
(14) Cf. 'Phenomenon', p. 335.
(15) 'My Fundamental Vision', in 'Toward', p. 174.
(16) 'Christ the Evolver', in 'Christianity and Evolution', (Harvest Book, 1974), p. 140.
(17) 'Phenomenon', p. 276.
(18) 'The Spirit of the Earth', in 'Human Energy' (Collins, 1969), p. 29.
(19) 'Turmoil or Genesis?', in 'The Future of Man' (Harper & Row, 1969), p. 228.
(20) 'The Planetisation of Mankind et. al.', in 'Future', p. 129.
(21) 'My Fundamental Vision', in 'Toward the Future' (Harvest Book, 1975), p. 179.
(22) 'Faith in Peace', in 'Future', p. 156.
(23) 'Cf. 'The Planetisation of Mankind et. al.', in 'Future', p. 129.
(24) 'Cf. 'The Planetisation of Mankind et. al.', in 'Future', p. 130.
(25) Cf. 'The Human Rebound of Evolution et. al.' in 'Future', p. 220.
(26) 'Faith in Peace', in 'Future', p. 156.
(27) 'The Phenomenon of Man' (Fountain Books, 1977), p. 310.
(28) 'Faith in Peace', in 'Future', p. 156.
(29) 'Faith in Peace', in 'Future', p. 156.
(30) 'Faith in Peace', in 'Future', p. 156.
(31) 'My Fundamental Vision', in 'Toward the Future' (Harvest Book, 1975), p. 181.
(32) 'My Fundamental Vision', in 'Toward', p. 181.
(33) 'My Fundamental Vision', in 'Toward', p. 181.
(34) 'The Planetisation of Mankind et. al.', in 'The Future of Man' (Harper & Row, 1969), p. 136.
(35) 'My Fundamental Vision', in 'Toward', p. 178.
(36) 'The Phenomenon of Man' (Fountain Books, 1977), pp. 312-313.
(37) 'Phenomenon', p. 275.
(38) 'Introduction to the Christian Life', in 'Christianity and Evolution' (Harvest Book, 1974), p. 168.
(39) 'Introduction to the Christian Life', in 'Christianity', p. 168.
(40) 'My Fundamental Vision', in 'Toward', p. 189.
(41) 'My Fundamental Vision', in 'Toward the Future' (Harvest Book, 1975), p. 181.
(42) 'Human Energy', in 'Human Energy' (Collins, 1969), pp. 128-129.
(43) 'My Fundamental Vision', in 'Toward', p. 174.
(44) 'The Phenomenon of Man' (Fountain Books, 1977), p. 246.
(45) 'Phenomenon', p. 182.
(46) 'My Fundamental Vision', in 'Toward', p. 171.
(47) 'My Fundamental Vision', in 'Toward', p. 171 (In footnote # 5).

Posted 26/3/02 in the Teilhard eGroup