Summary Teilhard states
that biology evolves without special borders into human socialization,
of which religion is an important part. Hence religion behaves like a biological
phylum.
Introduction
Teilhard expresses
his support for a new approach to human biology. In this regard he advocates
'a special biology of man: a biology that is necessitated by, and
defined by, the breakthrough of reflection.' (1) Granted, such a biology
will have features in common with the normal, everyday biological sciences
that deal with life at the levels of 'viruses and genes' and 'cellular
beings'. (2) But humanity needs a special biology of its own because humankind
is, itself, special in that it possesses characteristics which transcend
those found at, say, the strictly viral or cellular planes of life.
The human race, as
the French Jesuit sees it, is not simply another zoological grouping among
countless other such groupings. No, from his perspective, when the first
humans appeared upon the surface of the earth, around the end of the Tertiary
period, they constituted, in effect, 'a second species of life' (3), a
significantly novel form of vitality with brand new powers never before
exercised on our globe.
From Teilhard's standpoint,
what will render his proposed, new, human biology so special is the fact
that it will take into account all of these novel powers instead of passing
over them in silence, as, by and large, happens at the present time. Let's
try to pin down some of the new powers that appertain, on our planet, exclusively
to the "second species of life", to humankind.
Human
Intelligence
Humanity, Teilhard
tells us, is the only zoological group that thinks abstractly, that
reflects. 'Man', we are told by the Jesuit from Auvergne, 'is the only
being, within the limits of our experience, who not only knows, but knows
that he knows.' (4) As Teilhard sees it, the human phylum was the only
one that, here on earth, 'was able, at a given moment (towards the end
of the Tertiary period) to break through the mysterious surface which separates
the sphere of intelligence from that of instinct'. (5)
1. The emergence
of human consciousness
Teilhard
assumes, without evidence, that homo sapiens, or even earlier hominids,
were reflective from their initial evolution. He does not apply the evolutionary
paradigm to the development of human self-consciousness. There is clear
evidence that human self-consciousness is less than 4,000 years old and
is a product of human self-creation. [Tony
KELLY, 27/3/02] What is
the "clear evidence"? [Grahame
FALLON, 27.03.02]
As Brian has pointed
out, Teilhard's view of human self-creation is very similar to mine. The
difference appears to be that Teilhard sees the faculty of self-consciousness
as something that is ultimately latent in all matter, while I see only
an intrinsic organising principle or logos as latent in matter, with this
logos giving rise to the self-organization of matter, eventually producing
the Earth and, following the initiation of life, giving rise to the more
complex mutations that are presented for selection, a process which moves
beyond self-organization towards self-creation. When human cultures begin,
evolution becomes cultural evolution, ultimately producing moral cultures,
at which time human moral-cultural self-creation becomes totally free self-creation,
in contrast to the deterministic self-organization of matter that began
the process of the cosmos. The detailed arguments in favour of that scenario
can be seen in "The Process of the Cosmos: Philosophical Theology and Cosmology"
(1999) USA, Dissertation.com, particularly Chapter 5, also on my
Web Page. I argue that it is
only with the emergence of self-consciousness that the moral sense emerges.
Humans had tribal rules (often immoral) before 4,000 years ago, but the
emergence of morality per se falls within the last 4,000 years, the best
evidence being Moses. [Tony
KELLY, 29.03.02]
My [i.e. Brian's] suspicion
grows that the gap between [the] outlook [that also self-consciousness
was something that evolved] and Teilhard's [that Homo Sapiens was reflective
from his initial existence] may not be as huge as might appear at first
sight. Tony argues "that
human self-consciousness is less than 4,000 years old and is a product
of human self-creation". Certainly, Teilhard agrees that humanity's growth
in consciousness and self-consciousness involves man 'modifying, or even
creating, his own self'. (41) So, for both visions, the element of self-creation
(in the sense of self-development) is a factor in the evolution of human
consciousness.
While Tony may be
saying that self-consciousness just was not there at all prior to 4,000
years ago, Teilhard appears to be claiming that it was largely latent for
a very long time, up to a time, perhaps, bordering on the 4,000 years or
so ago to which Tony alludes. Here again the gap between Tony's "not there"
and Teilhard's "largely latent" may not be a huge one.
Teilhard, I believe,
spells out for us his view on the transit of powers of consciousness from
latency to actuality in the following passage in which he begins by pointing
our thoughts:
'...in the
direction of a decisive expansion of our ancient powers, reinforced by
the acquisition of certain new faculties of consciousness [e. g. the gradual
acquisition of a faculty to think more on the basis of observations and
less on the basis of myths?]. [We perceive the]
expansion or even metamorphosis of certain ancient powers. For the last
century, without greatly noticing it, we have been undergoing a remarkable
transformation in the range of intellect. To discover and know has always
been a deep tendency of our nature. Can we not recognise it already in
cave man? But it is only yesterday [e. g. within less than 4,000 years
into the past] that this essential need to know has become explicit and
changed into a vital autonomous function, taking precedence in our lives
over our preoccupation with food and drink.' (42)
Tony states that Teilhard
"assumes without evidence, that homo sapiens, or even earlier hominids,
were reflective from their initial evolution". Perhaps the French Jesuit
would dispute the phrase "without evidence". I think he would say there
is some evidence of at least rudimentary reflective activity, although,
no doubt, he would concede that evidence is just that, evidence and not
indubitable proof. In my view, Teilhard's
argument for possible evidence of the presence of reflective activity,
prior to roughly 4,000 years ago, might run along lines such as the following.
In his opinion, one of the signs of reflection is 'the power of rational
invention' (43), the power to mentally visualize and then fabricate '"artificial"
constructions' (44). And certainly there were inventions, artificial constructions,
arising out of the hominoid phylum, prior to 4,000 years ago, inventions
and constructions that, to all appearances, no other biological phylum
was able to significantly rival. Some examples:
- The appearance
of the first chipped stone tools, in Africa, about 2 million years
ago. In this connection, Teilhard himself asks in a tone of wonderment:
'Between the last strata of the Pliocene period, in which man is absent,
and the next, in which the geologist is dumbfounded to find the first chipped
pieces of quartz, what has happened?' (45) He might try to answer his own
question by opining that a creature capable of rudimentary inventive thought,
thought that led to the invention of stone tools, had arrived on the terrestrial
scene.
- The control of
fire about 800 thousand years ago.
- The organization
of large scale, co-ordinated animal hunts around 500 thousand years
ago.
- The beginning
of ritual burials approximately 60,000 years ago, possibly suggesting
some religious sense and some notion of an afterlife.
- Record keeping
(a primitive form of writing), by way of markings on bones, which appeared
about 35,000 years ago.
- Artistic expression
which began some 30,000 years ago or so by way of paintings on cave
walls and the carving of figurines, both of which art forms may also have
had a religious dimension.
- The invention
of the bone needle and the bow and arrow between about 10 and 20 thousand years ago.
- The development
of metallurgy and of agriculture likely not much more than 10 thousand years.
All of these inventions,
as well as others not mentioned, would, I believe, be seen, by Teilhard,
as evidence of at least rudimentary of reflective thought. To be sure,
he would also see such primitive thinking as possessing the potential to
expand into more fully blown states of awareness, for example the state
of awareness associated with a well developed self-consciousness. So perhaps what Teilhard
is saying, as regards the emergence of human consciousness, is something
like the following. The hominoid phylum has been on the road to self-awareness
for some two million years or so. For an overwhelmingly vast majority of
that time, the human powers of consciousness have been, to a not negligible
degree, latent, and what powers were used got utilized mainly in aid of
survival, in support of a "preoccupation with food and drink". Only recently
have some of these powers made the transit from significant latency to
significant actuality.
Perhaps I could present
a what if scenario which Teilhard himself suggests. What if we were to claim that for most of the last 2 million years or so the humanoid
phylum was really not significantly different (in terms of the journey
to self-consciousness) from all of the other mammalian species on our globe?
In my opinion, the French Jesuit, might, in reply to our query, repeat
to us what he wrote in a 1948 essay. Within the pages of 'My Fundamental
Vision' he, first of all, states that, in his opinion, 'man is the only
being, within the limits of our experience, who not only knows, but knows
that he knows.' (46) Then, in a footnote related to this statement, he
adds:
'If, as
we are sometimes told, other animal species shared this characteristic
[i. e. the characteristic of knowing that we know] with us, then those
species (which appeared chronologically before man) would long ago have
become masters of the world; and in such conditions, man would never have
appeared on earth.' (47)
So, in the eyes of the
French Jesuit, our present biology, satisfactory though it is for dealing
with instinctual life, needs to be significantly expanded, in its scope,
if it is to be up to the task of adequately coping with thinking life.
Otherwise put, today's biology, acceptable as it is for the scientific
investigation of the biosphere, has to be enlarged in its purview, if it
is to competently probe the noosphere. In Teilhard's view,
then, human beings, because they belong to the one terrestrial zoological
group that has made the transit from instinctual to thinking life, possess
a multiplicity of abilities, tendencies and aspirations which are lacking
to the animal species whose conscious existence is rigidly circumscribed
by non-reflective instinct. Let's look, in some detail, at a number of
these abilities, tendencies and aspirations, and let's also try to get
some idea as to how a specifically human biology might accommodate them.
2. Inventivity
Among the unique
abilities associated with thought is that of 'the power of rational invention'.
(6) From a biological perspective, we are led, Teilhard believes, to perceive
our inventions, 'our "artificial" constructions' as manifesting 'an extension
in reflective form of the obscure mechanism whereby each new form has always
germinated on the trunk of life'. (7) It is the view of the Auvergnian
Jesuit that 'the mole is a digging instrument' and that 'the porpoise is
a swimming instrument and the bird a flying instrument'. (8) Further, as
he sees it, there exists a connection between, on the one hand, these instruments,
and, on the other hand, contrivances like the power shovel, the submarine
and the aeroplane, which are, themselves also, respectively, a digging
instrument, a swimming instrument and a flying instrument. In this connection
he writes:
'To appreciate
man at his true zoological value, we should not separate "natural" from
"artificial" as absolutely as we do in our perspectives, that is to
say ignore the profound connexions between the ship, the submarine, the
aeroplane and the animal reconstitutions which produce the wing and the
fin.' (9)
And what, we may ask,
is the biological connection between the two sets of instruments? Well,
both have germinated "on the trunk of life", the first set by way of instinct
and the second set by way of reflection. Both have emerged from the same
trunk of the same tree, the tree of terrestrial life. Now, because both
sets are connected with life, both are connected with biology. From Teilhard's
standpoint, a special human biology would take into account such phenomena
as human inventions, perceiving them as extensions of human life, as aspects
of human biology. Another aspect of
creative thinking is that it is a constructive, "evolutionary" reaction
to problems and failure. As said L.L. Whyte:
'Thought
is born of failure. Only when the human organism fails to achieve an adequate
response to its situation is there material for the processes of thought,
and the greater the failure the more searching they become.' [quoted by
Janice Paulsen]
3. Seeing the future A further ability
connected to thought, Teilhard tells us is a 'pre-awareness of the future'
(10), a precognition of what is to come which is far more elaborate
than, say, that of a squirrel, the extent of whose powers of foresight
may well not go much beyond perceiving that its next meal will consist
of a particular nut lying in some grass close to the base of a nearby tree.
Our human life form is one that foresees the future with significantly
more clarity than any other form of life inhabiting our planet.
4. Organizing
the future
Our pre-awareness
of what may lie ahead, combined with our inventiveness, inclines us humans
in the direction of planning and organizing out future. For example,
we develop political and economic systems which we hope will permit our
social relationships, and our exchanges of good and services, to be carried
out at some level of co-ordination and order that we deem to be acceptable.
We produce art and invent methods of writing, at least one of whose functions
can be to preserve the past into the future. And all of these activities
seem to arise naturally, and as a matter of course, out of our biological
wherewithal, out of our vital make-up.
Death
and Religion
The fact that we
humans have some measure of precognition in relation to the future also
permits us to foresee our own deaths. Further, thanks to the discoveries
of our astronomers and astrophysicists, we understand that our own sun
may well, some five thousand million years hence, arrive at its own end
time. And, as part of the process of its demise, that sun will, perhaps,
expand into its red giant phase, envelope our globe, and destroy all life
on earth. Indeed, unless we are pretty well convinced that our universe
is everlasting, we have to face the possibility of the eventual extinction
of our cosmos by way, for example, of a "Big Crunch" (the reversal of expansion)
or a "Big Whimper" (a prolongation of expansion to the point of a dispersal
approaching infinity).
In the opinion of
Teilhard, our prescience of death, be it at the personal, planetary or
cosmic level, constitutes a factor in the rise of religion. Why? Well,
one of the functions of religion is that of making sense of death. For
his part, the French Jesuit finds unacceptable the prospect of an ultimate,
total death for humankind, be that death individual or collective. In his
view, should we humans, as a whole, ever become persuaded that our destiny,
individually and collectively, is inexorably pointing us towards a dead
end of total extinction, then terrestrial evolution will come to a standstill.
As Teilhard sees it, the human species, confronted with the unavoidable
prospect of complete annihilation, would 'realise once and for all that
its only course would be to go on strike' (11), to shut down the shop-floor
of evolution, so to speak. Why bother, we would ask ourselves, to toil
away, pointlessly, at advancing a development that is, in the final analysis,
going nowhere except to extinguishment?
'An animal', Teilhard
tells us, 'may rush headlong down a blind alley or towards a precipice.'
(12) But not so humanity, for 'man will never take a step in a direction
he knows to be blocked.' (13) In the opinion of the Auvergnian Jesuit,
no human being, having arrived at a certain critical level of awareness,
will ever consent to enter the blind alley of ultimate pointlessness or
hasten, unthinkingly, towards the precipice of complete annihilation. As
Teilhard sees it, one of the functions of religion is to point out to humanity
that its efforts are not pointless and that, by way of that part of its
make-up which has become spiritualized, humankind does escape extinction,
individually and collectively, through the attainment of immortality, or
as he sometimes terms it, 'irreversibility' (14).
For Teilhard, then,
in a certain real sense, religion, and its associated grapplings with the
problem of death, arise out of biology, out of life, at the reflective
level, at the level where life asks itself ultimate questions.
Towards
Socialization
1. Choice and
Ethics
In the opinion of
the French Jesuit, a properly human biology will also link up with the
realm of ethics or values, a realm where, as he puts it, there 'is attribution
of value to the individual, who moves from being a mere link in the phyletic
chain, to the dignity of an element capable of being integrated in an organic
totalization.' (15) Pre-human, living entities can be little more than
mere links in the evolutionary chain because, with no say in the matter,
they simply serve to connect, phyletically, what went before them to what
comes after them. By contrast, the value and dignity of human beings, in
the view of the Auvergnian Jesuit, lies in their ability, within limits,
to freely choose to support, or decline to support, the process of humanity's
convergence (or totalization) upon itself. Let's consider this subject
of human convergence a little more closely.
At the reflective
level, terrestrial evolution, for Teilhard, tends of its very nature, to
move convergently, confluently in the direction of becoming an organically
unified, ultra-human, vital entity, in the direction, that is, of growing
into 'a sort of super-organism' (16). But we, the human reflective elements,
the 'grains of thought' (17) who constitute the current tending to confluence
can say yea or nay to that current, and therein lies our value and our
dignity. We humans have some limited power either, on the one hand, to
facilitate that current or, on the other hand, to dam up, divert, or otherwise
delay it; the choice is ours.
2. From biology
to ethics
In Teilhard's opinion,
the entry of that which is biological into the domain of values and ethics
is an occurrence of some significance. In this connection he writes:
'One of the most
important aspects of hominization [i. e. of the emergence of thought],
from the point of view of the history of life, is the ascension of biological
realities (or values) to the domain of moral realities (or values). From
man onwards and in man, evolution has taken reflective consciousness of
itself. Henceforth it can to some degree recognize its position in the
world, choose its direction, and withhold its efforts.' (18)
At this point, though,
we might still be hesitating over the question of whether it is legitimate
to commingle together biology and ethics. We may continue to feel compelled
to ask ourselves what real grounds we have for seeing, contrary to our
intellectual tradition, the biological as an aspect of the moral and vice
versa. I think that Père Teilhard might reply to this concern along
the following lines. Humanity has the power and the liberty to enhance
or stunt the advance of evolution. This self-directing power and this 'freedom
of action' (19), which may be exercised pro or con evolution, are rooted
in reflective life, in human life. And because the power of free choice,
a sine qua non of ethics, is racinated in life, it has a biological tint
to it. So, seen from a certain perspective, a biological aspect manifests
itself in ethics and an ethical facet displays itself in human biology.
3. From Biology
to Socialization
From Teilhard's standpoint,
biology, at the reflective level, is prolonged in 'the socialization of
mankind' (20); he quite clearly makes an 'identification of human socialization
with the main terrestrial axis of evolution' (21). If I have understood
the French Jesuit correctly, human socialization is a convergent 'process
of in-folding' (22) of humankind upon itself. For him, the term "socialization"
seems to be an approximate synonym for terms such as 'planetisation' (23),
'collectivisation' (24), and 'totalisation' (25), all of which terms appear
to connote in-folding, confluence and convergence.
In the eyes of Teilhard,
the trend in the direction of human socialization constitutes an evolutionary
movement towards 'a sort of uniconscious super-organism' composed of 'races,
peoples, nations merging together.' (26) The French Jesuit does appear
to envisage humanity progressing towards a sort of common consciousness or mind, subtended in some fashion, by 'that great body made up of all
our bodies'. (27)
Teilhard does concede
that divergence has sometimes manifested itself more prominently than convergence
at the pre-human level of evolution. He grants that reciprocal hostility
has, on occasion, figured conspicuously in the behaviour of competing,
pre-reflective, living individuals and groups as these individuals and
groups have struggled to survive. In this regard he writes: 'Biologically
speaking, what has hitherto driven living creatures to mutual destruction
has clearly been the necessity which impelled them to supplant one another
in order to survive.' (28) But, in the opinion of the French Jesuit, this
propensity to internecine animosity begins to gradually change with the
arrival, on the scene, of a reflective humanity. As he sees it, from the
biological standpoint, there emerges an 'entirely new development in the
case of the human race'. (29) And this new development consists in this:
'...that
the outspreading and unfolding of [the pre-reflective] forms gradually
gives way to a process of in-folding. Then the previous economy of nature
undergoes a radical change: for converging branches do not survive by eliminating
each other; they have to unite. Everything that formerly made for war now
makes for peace, and the zoological laws of conservation and survival must
wear an opposite sign if they are applied to man.' (30)
In the opinion of Teilhard,
reflective life, in the process of socialization, introduces into the biological
milieu a degree of 'autonomous control and self-orientation'. (31)
In this regard, the French Jesuit writes that 'as a direct result of his
socialization, man is beginning, with rational design, to take over the
biological motive forces which determine his growth -- in other words,
he is becoming capable of modifying, or even of creating, his own self.'
(32) [As a matter of interest we may note that, in this quote, there is
something of an echo of Tony Kelly's concept of human self-creation.] So,
from Teilhard's perspective, one reason why human biology is special, is
that it has, as its subject matter, a form of life that is sufficiently
evolved to have acquired 'a power of auto-direction' (33), a form of life
that is somewhat less subject to determinism than is pre-reflective vitality. Teilhard makes it
plain that, from his standpoint, 'the processes of chemistry and biology
are continued without a break in the social sphere.' (34) In this regard,
he writes that:
'...socialization
is a direct equivalent, at the level of highly complex elements, of the
associations which at a lower level produce the molecules of protein, for
example, and the organic tissues; further, and most important of all, each
new, and more successful human grouping automatically subtends a further
increase of consciousness.' (35)
And, to be sure, in
the human social sphere, there is more autonomy, more sefl-orientation,
more freedom than we are accustomed, at present, to perceive in the subject
matter of biology. Biology
and Religion
In an earlier section
mention was made of how, in Teilhard's opinion, reflective life's prescience
of bodily death was a factor in the rise of religion. As this submission
draws to its close, I would like to turn my attention to a couple of further
ways in which the French Jesuit links biology, in general, to religion.
The first has to do with his blurring of the boundaries between science
(including the science of biology) and religion. The second relates to
his assimilating of Christianity to a living phylum. Let's look, one after
the other, at these two linkages which Teilhard proposes as connections
between the biological and the religious.
1. The Blurring
of Boundaries Between Biology and Religion
Teilhard declines
to draw a clear line of demarcation separating science (which includes
biology) from religion. Does he not tell us that 'religion and science
are the two conjugated faces or phases of one and the same complete act
of knowledge'? (36) He also opines that 'there is less difference than
people think between research and adoration.' (37) Here he comes very
close, it seems to me, to blurring the line that divides scientific research
from one of the forms of prayer, that of adoration or worship. [In some
theological circles it is held that there are four general kinds of prayer
as follows: a) that of adoration or worship; b) that of thanksgiving; c)
that of repentance; d) that of petition]
2. Christianity
Assimilated to a Living Phylum
Speaking of Christianity,
Teilhard states that:
'Biologically,
it behaves as a "phylum"; and by biological necessity it must, therefore,
have the structure of a phylum; in other words it, it must form a coherent
and progressive system of collectively associated spiritual elements.'
(38)
And under the rubric
of Christianity as a whole, he alludes to his own Roman Catholicism as
'the living organic axis' of the veritable 'religion of tomorrow'. (39)
Further, in the eyes of the French Jesuit, 'the Christian phenomenon, historically
speaking, is simply the final and central form assumed, following a long
and complex phylogenesis, by the persistent emergence at the heart of hominization
of the need to worship'. (40) So, there would seem
to be justification for claiming that, from a Teilhardian perspective,
biology,
in general, tends to introduce itself into precincts traditionally
held to be the exclusive preserve of religion.
Conclusions
In conclusion, let's
review some of the main points put forward in this submission.
1. From Teilhard's
perspective, a special human biology is desirable, because humanity
itself, among all terrestrial life forms, is special in that it is "a second
species of life". Here on our planet, only humankind possesses well developed
powers of reflective thought, of invention, of foresight, and of freedom
to make ethical choices.
2. Only human beings,
among all the living forms on the globe experience religious aspirations or as the French Jesuit puts it, "the need to worship".
3. Reflective terrestrial
life has a tendency to converge and in-fold upon itself by way of
a process of human socialization; all other species of life on earth incline
in the direction of outspreading and unfolding themselves. The former vitality
moves to convergence and organic unity; the latter vitalities drift off
towards phyletic dispersion and multiplicity. Among humans there is a level
of "auto-direction", of self-creation that is missing from pre-reflective
vital entities. And in the opinion of the French Jesuit, an adequate human
biology must take into account all of these special features that are part
and parcel of human life.
4. Finally, we noted
that, for Teilhard, there is a blurring of the boundaries between biology
and religion and that, in his view, Christianity itself behaves like
a biological phylum.
(1)
'My Fundamental Vision', in 'Toward the Future' (Harvest Book, 1975), p.
174.
(2)
'My Fundamental Vision', in 'Toward', p. 174.
(3)
'My Phenomenological View of the World et. al', in 'Toward', p. 213.
(4)
'My Fundamental Vision', in 'Toward', p. 171.
(5)
'My Fundamental Vision', in 'Toward', p. 173.
(6)
'My Fundamental Vision', in 'Toward', p. 174.
(7)
'The Phenomenon of Man' (Fountain Books, 1977), p. 246.
(8)
'Hominization', in 'The Vision of the Past' (Collins, 1966), pp. 56-57.
(9)
'Hominization', in 'Vision', p. 57.
(10)
'My Fundamental Vision', in 'Toward the Future' (Harvest Book, 1975), p.
174.
(11)
'The Phenomenon of Man' (Fountain Books, 1977), p. 335.
(12)
'Phenomenon', p. 254.
(13)
'Phenomenon', p. 254.
(14)
Cf. 'Phenomenon', p. 335.
(15)
'My Fundamental Vision', in 'Toward', p. 174.
(16)
'Christ the Evolver', in 'Christianity and Evolution', (Harvest Book, 1974),
p. 140.
(17)
'Phenomenon', p. 276.
(18)
'The Spirit of the Earth', in 'Human Energy' (Collins, 1969), p. 29.
(19)
'Turmoil or Genesis?', in 'The Future of Man' (Harper & Row, 1969),
p. 228.
(20)
'The Planetisation of Mankind et. al.', in 'Future', p. 129.
(21)
'My Fundamental Vision', in 'Toward the Future' (Harvest Book, 1975), p.
179.
(22)
'Faith in Peace', in 'Future', p. 156.
(23)
'Cf. 'The Planetisation of Mankind et. al.', in 'Future', p. 129.
(24)
'Cf. 'The Planetisation of Mankind et. al.', in 'Future', p. 130.
(25)
Cf. 'The Human Rebound of Evolution et. al.' in 'Future', p. 220.
(26)
'Faith in Peace', in 'Future', p. 156.
(27)
'The Phenomenon of Man' (Fountain Books, 1977), p. 310.
(28)
'Faith in Peace', in 'Future', p. 156.
(29)
'Faith in Peace', in 'Future', p. 156.
(30)
'Faith in Peace', in 'Future', p. 156.
(31)
'My Fundamental Vision', in 'Toward the Future' (Harvest Book, 1975), p.
181.
(32)
'My Fundamental Vision', in 'Toward', p. 181.
(33)
'My Fundamental Vision', in 'Toward', p. 181.
(34)
'The Planetisation of Mankind et. al.', in 'The Future of Man' (Harper
& Row, 1969), p. 136.
(35)
'My Fundamental Vision', in 'Toward', p. 178.
(36)
'The Phenomenon of Man' (Fountain Books, 1977), pp. 312-313.
(37)
'Phenomenon', p. 275.
(38)
'Introduction to the Christian Life', in 'Christianity and Evolution' (Harvest
Book, 1974), p. 168.
(39)
'Introduction to the Christian Life', in 'Christianity', p. 168.
(40)
'My Fundamental Vision', in 'Toward', p. 189.
(41)
'My Fundamental Vision', in 'Toward the Future' (Harvest Book, 1975), p.
181.
(42)
'Human Energy', in 'Human Energy' (Collins, 1969), pp. 128-129.
(43)
'My Fundamental Vision', in 'Toward', p. 174.
(44)
'The Phenomenon of Man' (Fountain Books, 1977), p. 246.
(45)
'Phenomenon', p. 182.
(46)
'My Fundamental Vision', in 'Toward', p. 171.
(47)
'My Fundamental Vision', in 'Toward', p. 171 (In footnote # 5).
