Teilhard expresses his support for a new approach to human biology. In this regard he advocates 'a special biology of man: a biology that is necessitated by, and defined by, the breakthrough of reflection.' (1) Granted, such a biology will have features in common with the normal, everyday biological sciences that deal with life at the levels of 'viruses and genes' and 'cellular beings'. (2) But humanity needs a special biology of its own because humankind is, itself, special in that it possesses characteristics which transcend those found at, say, the strictly viral or cellular planes of life.
The human race, as the French Jesuit sees it, is not simply another zoological grouping among countless other such groupings. No, from his perspective, when the first humans appeared upon the surface of the earth, around the end of the Tertiary period, they constituted, in effect, 'a second species of life' (3), a significantly novel form of vitality with brand new powers never before exercised on our globe.
From Teilhard's standpoint, what will render his proposed, new, human biology so special is the fact that it will take into account all of these novel powers instead of passing over them in silence, as, by and large, happens at the present time. Let's try to pin down some of the new powers that appertain, on our planet, exclusively to the "second species of life", to humankind.
Humanity, Teilhard tells us, is the only zoological group that thinks abstractly, that reflects. 'Man', we are told by the Jesuit from Auvergne, 'is the only being, within the limits of our experience, who not only knows, but knows that he knows.' (4) As Teilhard sees it, the human phylum was the only one that, here on earth, 'was able, at a given moment (towards the end of the Tertiary period) to break through the mysterious surface which separates the sphere of intelligence from that of instinct'. (5)
So, in the eyes of the French Jesuit, our present biology, satisfactory though it is for dealing with instinctual life, needs to be significantly expanded, in its scope, if it is to be up to the task of adequately coping with thinking life. Otherwise put, today's biology, acceptable as it is for the scientific investigation of the biosphere, has to be enlarged in its purview, if it is to competently probe the noosphere.
In Teilhard's view, then, human beings, because they belong to the one terrestrial zoological group that has made the transit from instinctual to thinking life, possess a multiplicity of abilities, tendencies and aspirations which are lacking to the animal species whose conscious existence is rigidly circumscribed by non-reflective instinct. Let's look, in some detail, at a number of these abilities, tendencies and aspirations, and let's also try to get some idea as to how a specifically human biology might accommodate them.
Among the unique abilities associated with thought is that of 'the power of rational invention'. (6) From a biological perspective, we are led, Teilhard believes, to perceive our inventions, 'our "artificial" constructions' as manifesting 'an extension in reflective form of the obscure mechanism whereby each new form has always germinated on the trunk of life'. (7) It is the view of the Auvergnian Jesuit that 'the mole is a digging instrument' and that 'the porpoise is a swimming instrument and the bird a flying instrument'. (8) Further, as he sees it, there exists a connection between, on the one hand, these instruments, and, on the other hand, contrivances like the power shovel, the submarine and the aeroplane, which are, themselves also, respectively, a digging instrument, a swimming instrument and a flying instrument. In this connection he writes:
'To appreciate man at his true zoological value, we should not separate "natural" from "artificial" as absolutely as we do in our perspectives, that is to say ignore the profound connexions between the ship, the submarine, the aeroplane and the animal reconstitutions which produce the wing and the fin.' (9)
And what, we may ask, is the biological connection between the two sets of instruments? Well, both have germinated "on the trunk of life", the first set by way of instinct and the second set by way of reflection. Both have emerged from the same trunk of the same tree, the tree of terrestrial life. Now, because both sets are connected with life, both are connected with biology. From Teilhard's standpoint, a special human biology would take into account such phenomena as human inventions, perceiving them as extensions of human life, as aspects of human biology.
A further ability connected to thought, Teilhard tells us is a 'pre-awareness of the future' (10), a precognition of what is to come which is far more elaborate than, say, that of a squirrel, the extent of whose powers of foresight may well not go much beyond perceiving that its next meal will consist of a particular nut lying in some grass close to the base of a nearby tree. Our human life form is one that foresees the future with significantly more clarity than any other form of life inhabiting our planet.
Our pre-awareness of what may lie ahead, combined with our inventiveness, inclines us humans in the direction of planning and organizing out future. For example, we develop political and economic systems which we hope will permit our social relationships, and our exchanges of good and services, to be carried out at some level of co-ordination and order that we deem to be acceptable. We produce art and invent methods of writing, at least one of whose functions can be to preserve the past into the future. And all of these activities seem to arise naturally, and as a matter of course, out of our biological wherewithal, out of our vital make-up.
The fact that we humans have some measure of precognition in relation to the future also permits us to foresee our own deaths. Further, thanks to the discoveries of our astronomers and astrophysicists, we understand that our own sun may well, some five thousand million years hence, arrive at its own end time. And, as part of the process of its demise, that sun will, perhaps, expand into its red giant phase, envelope our globe, and destroy all life on earth. Indeed, unless we are pretty well convinced that our universe is everlasting, we have to face the possibility of the eventual extinction of our cosmos by way, for example, of a "Big Crunch" (the reversal of expansion) or a "Big Whimper" (a prolongation of expansion to the point of a dispersal approaching infinity).
In the opinion of Teilhard, our prescience of death, be it at the personal, planetary or cosmic level, constitutes a factor in the rise of religion. Why? Well, one of the functions of religion is that of making sense of death. For his part, the French Jesuit finds unacceptable the prospect of an ultimate, total death for humankind, be that death individual or collective. In his view, should we humans, as a whole, ever become persuaded that our destiny, individually and collectively, is inexorably pointing us towards a dead end of total extinction, then terrestrial evolution will come to a standstill. As Teilhard sees it, the human species, confronted with the unavoidable prospect of complete annihilation, would 'realise once and for all that its only course would be to go on strike' (11), to shut down the shop-floor of evolution, so to speak. Why bother, we would ask ourselves, to toil away, pointlessly, at advancing a development that is, in the final analysis, going nowhere except to extinguishment?
'An animal', Teilhard tells us, 'may rush headlong down a blind alley or towards a precipice.' (12) But not so humanity, for 'man will never take a step in a direction he knows to be blocked.' (13) In the opinion of the Auvergnian Jesuit, no human being, having arrived at a certain critical level of awareness, will ever consent to enter the blind alley of ultimate pointlessness or hasten, unthinkingly, towards the precipice of complete annihilation. As Teilhard sees it, one of the functions of religion is to point out to humanity that its efforts are not pointless and that, by way of that part of its make-up which has become spiritualized, humankind does escape extinction, individually and collectively, through the attainment of immortality, or as he sometimes terms it, 'irreversibility' (14).
For Teilhard, then, in a certain real sense, religion, and its associated grapplings with the problem of death, arise out of biology, out of life, at the reflective level, at the level where life asks itself ultimate questions.
In the opinion of the French Jesuit, a properly human biology will also link up with the realm of ethics or values, a realm where, as he puts it, there 'is attribution of value to the individual, who moves from being a mere link in the phyletic chain, to the dignity of an element capable of being integrated in an organic totalization.' (15) Pre-human, living entities can be little more than mere links in the evolutionary chain because, with no say in the matter, they simply serve to connect, phyletically, what went before them to what comes after them. By contrast, the value and dignity of human beings, in the view of the Auvergnian Jesuit, lies in their ability, within limits, to freely choose to support, or decline to support, the process of humanity's convergence (or totalization) upon itself. Let's consider this subject of human convergence a little more closely.
At the reflective level, terrestrial evolution, for Teilhard, tends of its very nature, to move convergently, confluently in the direction of becoming an organically unified, ultra-human, vital entity, in the direction, that is, of growing into 'a sort of super-organism' (16). But we, the human reflective elements, the 'grains of thought' (17) who constitute the current tending to confluence can say yea or nay to that current, and therein lies our value and our dignity. We humans have some limited power either, on the one hand, to facilitate that current or, on the other hand, to dam up, divert, or otherwise delay it; the choice is ours.
In Teilhard's opinion, the entry of that which is biological into the domain of values and ethics is an occurrence of some significance. In this connection he writes:
'One of the most important aspects of hominization [i. e. of the emergence of thought], from the point of view of the history of life, is the ascension of biological realities (or values) to the domain of moral realities (or values). From man onwards and in man, evolution has taken reflective consciousness of itself. Henceforth it can to some degree recognize its position in the world, choose its direction, and withhold its efforts.' (18)
At this point, though, we might still be hesitating over the question of whether it is legitimate to commingle together biology and ethics. We may continue to feel compelled to ask ourselves what real grounds we have for seeing, contrary to our intellectual tradition, the biological as an aspect of the moral and vice versa. I think that Père Teilhard might reply to this concern along the following lines. Humanity has the power and the liberty to enhance or stunt the advance of evolution. This self-directing power and this 'freedom of action' (19), which may be exercised pro or con evolution, are rooted in reflective life, in human life. And because the power of free choice, a sine qua non of ethics, is racinated in life, it has a biological tint to it. So, seen from a certain perspective, a biological aspect manifests itself in ethics and an ethical facet displays itself in human biology.
From Teilhard's standpoint, biology, at the reflective level, is prolonged in 'the socialization of mankind' (20); he quite clearly makes an 'identification of human socialization with the main terrestrial axis of evolution' (21). If I have understood the French Jesuit correctly, human socialization is a convergent 'process of in-folding' (22) of humankind upon itself. For him, the term "socialization" seems to be an approximate synonym for terms such as 'planetisation' (23), 'collectivisation' (24), and 'totalisation' (25), all of which terms appear to connote in-folding, confluence and convergence.
In the eyes of Teilhard, the trend in the direction of human socialization constitutes an evolutionary movement towards 'a sort of uniconscious super-organism' composed of 'races, peoples, nations merging together.' (26) The French Jesuit does appear to envisage humanity progressing towards a sort of common consciousness or mind, subtended in some fashion, by 'that great body made up of all our bodies'. (27)
Teilhard does concede that divergence has sometimes manifested itself more prominently than convergence at the pre-human level of evolution. He grants that reciprocal hostility has, on occasion, figured conspicuously in the behaviour of competing, pre-reflective, living individuals and groups as these individuals and groups have struggled to survive. In this regard he writes: 'Biologically speaking, what has hitherto driven living creatures to mutual destruction has clearly been the necessity which impelled them to supplant one another in order to survive.' (28) But, in the opinion of the French Jesuit, this propensity to internecine animosity begins to gradually change with the arrival, on the scene, of a reflective humanity. As he sees it, from the biological standpoint, there emerges an 'entirely new development in the case of the human race'. (29) And this new development consists in this:
'...that the outspreading and unfolding of [the pre-reflective] forms gradually gives way to a process of in-folding. Then the previous economy of nature undergoes a radical change: for converging branches do not survive by eliminating each other; they have to unite. Everything that formerly made for war now makes for peace, and the zoological laws of conservation and survival must wear an opposite sign if they are applied to man.' (30)
In the opinion of Teilhard, reflective life, in the process of socialization, introduces into the biological milieu a degree of 'autonomous control and self-orientation'. (31) In this regard, the French Jesuit writes that 'as a direct result of his socialization, man is beginning, with rational design, to take over the biological motive forces which determine his growth -- in other words, he is becoming capable of modifying, or even of creating, his own self.' (32) [As a matter of interest we may note that, in this quote, there is something of an echo of Tony Kelly's concept of human self-creation.] So, from Teilhard's perspective, one reason why human biology is special, is that it has, as its subject matter, a form of life that is sufficiently evolved to have acquired 'a power of auto-direction' (33), a form of life that is somewhat less subject to determinism than is pre-reflective vitality.
Teilhard makes it plain that, from his standpoint, 'the processes of chemistry and biology are continued without a break in the social sphere.' (34) In this regard, he writes that:
'...socialization is a direct equivalent, at the level of highly complex elements, of the associations which at a lower level produce the molecules of protein, for example, and the organic tissues; further, and most important of all, each new, and more successful human grouping automatically subtends a further increase of consciousness.' (35)
And, to be sure, in the human social sphere, there is more autonomy, more sefl-orientation, more freedom than we are accustomed, at present, to perceive in the subject matter of biology.
In Teilhard's opinion, reflective life's prescience of bodily death was a factor in the rise of religion. As this submission draws to its close, The first has to do with his blurring of the boundaries between science (including the science of biology) and religion. The second relates to his assimilating of Christianity to a living phylum. Let's look, one after the other, at these two linkages which Teilhard proposes as connections between the biological and the religious.
Teilhard declines to draw a clear line of demarcation separating science (which includes biology) from religion. Does he not tell us that 'religion and science are the two conjugated faces or phases of one and the same complete act of knowledge'? (36) He also opines that 'there is less difference than people think between research and adoration.' (37) Here he comes very close, it seems to me, to blurring the line that divides scientific research from one of the forms of prayer, that of adoration or worship. [In some theological circles it is held that there are four general kinds of prayer as follows: a) that of adoration or worship; b) that of thanksgiving; c) that of repentance; d) that of petition]
Speaking of Christianity, Teilhard states that: 'Biologically, it behaves as a "phylum"; and by biological necessity it must, therefore, have the structure of a phylum; in other words it, it must form a coherent and progressive system of collectively associated spiritual elements.' (38)
And under the rubric of Christianity as a whole, he alludes to his own Roman Catholicism as 'the living organic axis' of the veritable 'religion of tomorrow'. (39) Further, in the eyes of the French Jesuit, 'the Christian phenomenon, historically speaking, is simply the final and central form assumed, following a long and complex phylogenesis, by the persistent emergence at the heart of hominization of the need to worship'. (40)
So, there would seem to be justification for claiming that, from a Teilhardian perspective, biology, in general, tends to introduce itself into precincts traditionally held to be the exclusive preserve of religion.
In conclusion, let's review some of the main points put forward in this submission.
1. From Teilhard's perspective, a special human biology is desirable, because humanity itself, among all terrestrial life forms, is special in that it is "a second species of life". Here on our planet, only humankind possesses well developed powers of reflective thought, of invention, of foresight, and of freedom to make ethical choices.
2. Only human beings, among all the living forms on the globe experience religious aspirations or as the French Jesuit puts it, "the need to worship".
3. Reflective terrestrial life has a tendency to converge and in-fold upon itself by way of a process of human socialization; all other species of life on earth incline in the direction of outspreading and unfolding themselves. The former vitality moves to convergence and organic unity; the latter vitalities drift off towards phyletic dispersion and multiplicity. Among humans there is a level of "auto-direction", of self-creation that is missing from pre-reflective vital entities. And in the opinion of the French Jesuit, an adequate human biology must take into account all of these special features that are part and parcel of human life.
4. Finally, we noted that, for Teilhard, there is a blurring of the boundaries between biology and religion and that, in his view, Christianity itself behaves like a biological phylum.
(1) 'My Fundamental Vision', in 'Toward the Future' (Harvest Book, 1975), p. 174.
(2) 'My Fundamental Vision', in 'Toward', p. 174.
(3) 'My Phenomenological View of the World et. al', in 'Toward', p. 213.
(4) 'My Fundamental Vision', in 'Toward', p. 171.
(5) 'My Fundamental Vision', in 'Toward', p. 173.
(6) 'My Fundamental Vision', in 'Toward', p. 174.
(7) 'The Phenomenon of Man' (Fountain Books, 1977), p. 246.
(8) 'Hominization', in 'The Vision of the Past' (Collins, 1966), pp. 56-57.
(9) 'Hominization', in 'Vision', p. 57.
(10) 'My Fundamental Vision', in 'Toward the Future' (Harvest Book, 1975), p. 174.
(11) 'The Phenomenon of Man' (Fountain Books, 1977), p. 335.
(12) 'Phenomenon', p. 254.
(13) 'Phenomenon', p. 254.
(14) Cf. 'Phenomenon', p. 335.
(15) 'My Fundamental Vision', in 'Toward', p. 174.
(16) 'Christ the Evolver', in 'Christianity and Evolution', (Harvest Book, 1974), p. 140.
(17) 'Phenomenon', p. 276.
(18) 'The Spirit of the Earth', in 'Human Energy' (Collins, 1969), p. 29.
(19) 'Turmoil or Genesis?', in 'The Future of Man' (Harper & Row, 1969), p. 228.
(20) 'The Planetisation of Mankind et. al.', in 'Future', p. 129.
(21) 'My Fundamental Vision', in 'Toward the Future' (Harvest Book, 1975), p. 179.
(22) 'Faith in Peace', in 'Future', p. 156.
(23) 'Cf. 'The Planetisation of Mankind et. al.', in 'Future', p. 129.
(24) 'Cf. 'The Planetisation of Mankind et. al.', in 'Future', p. 130.
(25) Cf. 'The Human Rebound of Evolution et. al.' in 'Future', p. 220.
(26) 'Faith in Peace', in 'Future', p. 156.
(27) 'The Phenomenon of Man' (Fountain Books, 1977), p. 310.
(28) 'Faith in Peace', in 'Future', p. 156.
(29) 'Faith in Peace', in 'Future', p. 156.
(30) 'Faith in Peace', in 'Future', p. 156.
(31) 'My Fundamental Vision', in 'Toward the Future' (Harvest Book, 1975), p. 181.
(32) 'My Fundamental Vision', in 'Toward', p. 181.
(33) 'My Fundamental Vision', in 'Toward', p. 181.
(34) 'The Planetisation of Mankind et. al.', in 'The Future of Man' (Harper & Row, 1969), p. 136.
(35) 'My Fundamental Vision', in 'Toward', p. 178.
(36) 'The Phenomenon of Man' (Fountain Books, 1977), pp. 312-313.
(37) 'Phenomenon', p. 275.
(38) 'Introduction to the Christian Life', in 'Christianity and Evolution' (Harvest Book, 1974), p. 168.
(39) 'Introduction to the Christian Life', in 'Christianity', p. 168.
(40) 'My Fundamental Vision', in 'Toward', p. 189.
(41) 'My Fundamental Vision', in 'Toward the Future' (Harvest Book, 1975), p. 181.
(42) 'Human Energy', in 'Human Energy' (Collins, 1969), pp. 128-129.
(43) 'My Fundamental Vision', in 'Toward', p. 174.
(44) 'The Phenomenon of Man' (Fountain Books, 1977), p. 246.
(45) 'Phenomenon', p. 182.
(46) 'My Fundamental Vision', in 'Toward', p. 171.
(47) 'My Fundamental Vision', in 'Toward', p. 171 (In footnote # 5).
